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 * Cosmetics for ccd
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# The cryptographic device driver (CGD)

The [cgd(4)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?cgd+4+NetBSD-current) driver 
provides functionality which allows you to use disks or partitions for encrypted 
storage. After providing the appropriate key, the encrypted partition is 
accessible using `cgd` pseudo-devices.

## Overview

People often store sensitive information on their hard disks and are concerned 
about this information falling into the wrong hands. This is particularly 
relevant to users of laptops and other portable devices, or portable media, 
which might be stolen or accidentally misplaced.

### Why use disk encryption?

File-oriented encryption tools like GnuPG are great for encrypting individual 
files, which can then be sent across untrusted networks as well as stored 
encrypted on disk. But sometimes they can be inconvenient, because the file must 
be decrypted each time it is to be used; this is especially cumbersome when you 
have a large collection of files to protect. Any time a security tool is 
cumbersome to use, there's a chance you'll forget to use it properly, leaving 
the files unprotected for the sake of convenience.

Worse, readable copies of the encrypted contents might still exist on the hard 
disk. Even if you overwrite these files (using `rm -P`) before unlinking them, 
your application software might make temporary copies you don't know about, or 
have been paged to swapspace - and even your hard disk might have silently 
remapped failing sectors with data still in them.

The solution is to simply never write the information unencrypted to the hard 
disk. Rather than taking a file-oriented approach to encryption, consider a 
block-oriented approach - a virtual hard disk, that looks just like a normal 
hard disk with normal filesystems, but which encrypts and decrypts each block on 
the way to and from the real disk.

### Logical Disk Drivers

The `cgd` device looks and behaves to the rest of the operating system like any 
other disk driver. Rather than driving real hardware directly, it provides a 
logical function layered on top of another block device. It has a special 
configuration program, 
[cgdconfig(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?cgdconfig+8+NetBSD-current), 
to create and configure a `cgd` device and point it at the underlying disk 
device that will hold the encrypted data.

NetBSD includes several other similar logical block devices, each of which 
provides some other function where `cgd` provides encryption. You can stack 
several of these logical block devices together: you can make an encrypted 
`raid` to protect your encrypted data against hard disk failure as well.

Once you have created a `cgd` disk, you can use 
[disklabel(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?disklabel+8+NetBSD-current) 
to divide it up into partitions, 
[swapctl(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?swapctl+8+NetBSD-current) to 
enable swapping to those partitions or 
[newfs(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?newfs+8+NetBSD-current) to make 
filesystems, then `mount` and use those filesystems, just like any other new 
disk.

## Components of the Crypto-Graphic Disk system

A number of components and tools work together to make the `cgd` system 
effective.

### Kernel driver pseudo-device

To use `cgd` you need a kernel with support for the `cgd` pseudo-device. Make 
sure the following line is in the kernel configuration file:

    pseudo-device   cgd     4       # cryptographic disk driver

The number specifies how many `cgd` devices may be configured at the same time. 
After configuring the `cgd` pseudo-device you can recompile the kernel and boot 
it to enable `cgd` support.

### Ciphers

The `cgd` driver provides the following encryption algorithms:

 * `aes-cbc` -- AES (Rijndael). AES uses a 128 bit blocksize and accepts 128, 
   192 or 256 bit keys.

 * `blowfish-cbc` -- Blowfish uses a 64 bit blocksize and accepts 128 bit keys

 * `3des-cbc` -- Triple DES uses a 64 bit blocksize and accepts 192 bit keys 
   (only 168 bits are actually used for encryption)

All three ciphers are used in [CBC (Cipher Block 
Chaining)](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cipher_block_chaining)
mode. This means each block is XORed with the previous encrypted block before 
encryption. This reduces the risk that a pattern can be found, which can be used 
to break the encryption.

### Verification Methods

Another aspect of `cgd` that needs some attention are the verification methods 
`cgdconfig` provides. These verification methods are used to verify the 
passphrase is correct. The following verification methods are available:

 * `none` -- no verification is performed. This can be dangerous, because the 
   key is not verified at all. When a wrong key is entered, `cgdconfig` 
   configures the `cgd` device as normal, but data which was available on the 
   volume will be destroyed (decrypting blocks with a wrong key will result in 
   random data, which will result in a regeneration of the disklabel with the 
   current key).

 * `disklabel` -- `cgdconfig` scans for a valid disklabel. If a valid disklabel 
   is found with the key that is provided authentication will succeed.

 * `ffs` -- `cgdconfig` scans for a valid FFS file system. If a valid FFS file 
   system is found with the key that is provided authentication will succeed.

## Example: encrypting your disk

This section works through a step-by-step example of converting an existing 
system to use `cgd`, performing the following actions:

 1. Preparing the disk and partitions
 2. Scrub off all data
 3. Create the cgd
 4. Adjust config-files
 5. Restoring your backed-up files to the encrypted disk

### Preparing the disk

First, decide which filesystems you want to move to an encrypted device. You're 
going to need to leave at least the small root (`/`) filesystem unencrypted, in 
order to load the kernel and run `init`, `cgdconfig` and the `rc.d` scripts that 
configure your `cgd`. In this example, we'll encrypt everything except the root 
(`/`) filesystem.

We are going to delete and re-make partitions and filesystems, and will require 
a backup to restore the data. So make sure you have a current, reliable backup 
stored on a different disk or machine. Do your backup in single-user mode, with 
the filesystems unmounted, to ensure you get a clean 
[dump(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?dump+8+NetBSD-current). Make sure you 
back up the disklabel of your hard disk as well, so you have a record of the 
partition layout before you started.

With the system at single user, `/` mounted read-write and everything else 
unmounted, use 
[disklabel(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?disklabel+8+NetBSD-current)
to delete all the data partitions you want to move into `cgd`.

Then make a single new partition in all the space you just freed up, say, 
`wd0e`. Set the partition type for this partition to `cgd` Though it doesn't 
really matter what it is, it will help remind you that it's not a normal 
filesystem later. When finished, label the disk to save the new partition table.

### Scrubbing the disk

We have removed the partition table information, but the existing filesystems 
and data are still on disk. Even after we make a `cgd` device, create 
filesystems, and restore our data, some of these disk blocks might not yet be 
overwritten and still contain our data in plaintext. This is especially likely 
if the filesystems are mostly empty. We want to scrub the disk before we go 
further.

We could use 
[dd(1)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?dd+1+NetBSD-current)
to copy `/dev/zero` over the new `wd0e` partition, but this will leave our disk 
full of zeros, except where we've written encrypted data later. We might not 
want to give an attacker any clues about which blocks contain real data, and 
which are free space, so we want to write "noise" into all the disk blocks. So 
we'll create a temporary `cgd`, configured with a random, unknown key.

First, we configure a `cgd` to use a random key:

    # cgdconfig -s cgd0 /dev/wd0e aes-cbc 128 < /dev/urandom 

Now we can write zeros into the raw partition of our `cgd` (`/dev/rcgd0d` on 
NetBSD/i386, `/dev/rcgd0c` on most other platforms):

    # dd if=/dev/zero of=/dev/rcgd0d bs=32k

The encrypted zeros will look like random data on disk. This might take a while 
if you have a large disk. Once finished, unconfigure the random-key `cgd`:

    # cgdconfig -u cgd0

### Creating the `cgd`

The 
[cgdconfig(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?cgdconfig+8+NetBSD-current) 
program, which manipulates `cgd` devices, uses parameters files to store such 
information as the encryption type, key length, and a random password salt for 
each `cgd`. These files are very important, and need to be kept safe - without 
them, you will not be able to decrypt the data!

We'll generate a parameters file and write it into the default location (make 
sure the directory `/etc/cgd` exists and is mode 700):

    # cgdconfig -g -V disklabel -o /etc/cgd/wd0e aes-cbc 256

This creates a parameters file `/etc/cgd/wd0e` describing a `cgd` using the 
`aes-cbc` cipher method, a key verification method of `disklabel`, and a key 
length of `256` bits. It will look something like this:

    algorithm aes-cbc;
    iv-method encblkno;
    keylength 256;
    verify_method disklabel;
    keygen pkcs5_pbkdf2/sha1 {
            iterations 6275;
            salt AAAAgHTg/jKCd2ZJiOSGrgnadGw=;
    };

*Note*: Remember, you'll want to save this file somewhere safe later.

*Tip*: When creating the parameters file, `cgdconfig` reads from `/dev/random` 
to create the password salt. This read may block if there is not enough 
collected entropy in the random pool. This is unlikely, especially if you just 
finished overwriting the disk as in the previous step, but if it happens you can 
press keys on the console and/or move your mouse until the `rnd` device gathers 
enough entropy.

Now it's time to create our `cgd`, for which we'll need a passphrase. This 
passphrase needs to be entered every time the `cgd` is opened, which is usually 
at each reboot. The encryption key is derived from this passphrase and the salt. 
Make sure you choose something you won't forget, and others won't guess.

The first time we configure the `cgd`, there is no valid disklabel on the 
logical device, so the validation mechanism we want to use later won't work. We 
override it this one time:

    # cgdconfig -V re-enter cgd0 /dev/wd0e

This will prompt twice for a matching passphrase, just in case you make a typo, 
which would otherwise leave you with a `cgd` encrypted with a passphrase that's 
different to what you expected.

Now that we have a new `cgd`, we need to partition it and create filesystems. 
Recreate your previous partitions with all the same sizes, with the same letter 
names.

*Tip*: Remember to use the `disklabel -I` argument, because you're creating an 
initial label for a new disk.

*Note*: Although you want the sizes of your new partitions to be the same as the 
old, unencrypted ones, the offsets will be different because they're starting at 
the beginning of this virtual disk.

Then, use 
[newfs(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?newfs+8+NetBSD-current) to 
create filesystems on all the relevant partitions. This time your partitions 
will reflect the `cgd` disk names, for example:

    # newfs /dev/rcgd0h

### Modifying configuration files

We've moved several filesystems to another (logical) disk, and we need to update 
`/etc/fstab` accordingly. Each partition will have the same letter (in this 
example), but will be on `cgd0` rather than `wd0`. So you'll have `/etc/fstab` 
entries something like this:

    /dev/wd0a   /     ffs     rw    1 1
    /dev/cgd0b  none  swap    sw            0 0
    /dev/cgd0b  /tmp  mfs     rw,-s=132m    0 0
    /dev/cgd0e  /var  ffs     rw            1 2
    /dev/cgd0f  /usr  ffs     rw            1 2
    /dev/cgd0h  /home ffs     rw            1 2

*Note*: `/tmp` should be a separate filesystem, either `mfs` or `ffs`, inside 
the `cgd`, so that your temporary files are not stored in plain text in the `/` 
filesystem.

Each time you reboot, you're going to need your `cgd` configured early, before 
[fsck(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?fsck+8+NetBSD-current) runs and 
filesystems are mounted.

Put the following line in `/etc/cgd/cgd.conf`:

    cgd0    /dev/wd0e

This will use `/etc/cgd/wd0e` as config file for `cgd0`.

To finally enable cgd on each boot, put the following line into `/etc/rc.conf`:

    cgd=YES

You should now be prompted for `/dev/cgd0`'s passphrase whenever `/etc/rc` 
starts.

### Restoring data

Next, mount your new filesystems, and 
[restore(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?restore+8+NetBSD-current) your 
data into them. It often helps to have `/tmp` mounted properly first, as 
`restore` can use a fair amount of temporary space when extracting a large 
dumpfile.

To test your changes to the boot configuration, umount the filesystems and 
unconfigure the `cgd`, so when you exit the single-user shell, *rc* will run 
like on a clean boot, prompting you for the passphrase and mounting your 
filesystems correctly. Now you can bring the system up to multi-user, and make 
sure everything works as before.

## Example: encrypted CDs/DVDs

### Introduction

This section explains how to create and use encrypted CDs/DVDs with NetBSD (all 
I say about CDs here does also apply to DVDs). I assume that you have basic 
knowledge of cgd(4), so I will not explain what cgd is or what's inside it in 
detail. The same applies to vnd(4). One can make use of encrypted CDs after 
reading this howto, but for more detailed information about different cgd 
configuration options, please read the previous parts or the manpages.

### Creating an encrypted CD/DVD

cgd(4) provides highly secure encryption of whole partitions or disks. 
Unfortunately, creating "normal" CDs is not disklabeling something and running 
newfs on it. Neither can you just put a CDR into the drive, configure cgd and 
assume it to write encrypted data when syncing. Standard CDs contain at least an 
ISO-9660 filesystem created with mkisofs(8) from the 
[`sysutils/cdrtools`](http://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/pkgsrc/current/pkgsrc/sysutils/cdrtools/README.html) 
package. ISO images must *not* contain disklabels or cgd partitions.

But of course CD reader/writer hardware doesn't care about filesystems at all. 
You can write raw data to the CD if you like - or an encrypted FFS filesystem, 
which is what we'll do here. But be warned, there is NO way to read this CD with 
any OS except NetBSD - not even other BSDs due to the lack of cgd.

The basic steps when creating an encrypted CD are:

 * Create an (empty) imagefile
 * Register it as a virtual disk using vnd(4)
 * Configure cgd inside the vnd disk
 * Copy content to the cgd
 * Unconfigure all (flush!)
 * Write the image on a CD

The first step when creating an encrypted CD is to create a single image file 
with dd. The image may not grow, so make it large enough to allow all CD content 
to fit into. Note that the whole image gets written to the CD later, so creating 
a 700 MB image for 100 MB content will still require a 700 MB write operation to 
the CD. Some info on DVDs here: DVDs are only 4.7 GB in marketing language. 
4.7GB = 4.7 x 1024 x 1024 x 1024 = 5046586573 bytes. In fact, a DVD can only 
approximately hold 4.7 x 1000 x 1000 x 1000 = 4700000000 bytes, which is about 
4482 MB or about 4.37 GB. Keep this in mind when creating DVD images. Don't 
worry for CDs, they hold "real" 700 MB (734003200 Bytes).

Invoke all following commands as root!

For a CD:

    # dd if=/dev/zero of=image.img bs=1m count=700

or, for a DVD:

    # dd if=/dev/zero of=image.img bs=1m count=4482

Now configure a 
[vnd(4)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?vnd+4+NetBSD-5.0.1+i386)-pseudo 
disk with the image:

    # vnconfig vnd0 image.img

In order to use cgd, a so-called parameter file, describing encryption 
parameters and a containing "password salt" must be generated. We'll call it 
`/etc/cgd/image` here. You can use one parameter file for several encrypted 
partitions (I use one different file for each host and a shared file `image` for 
all removable media, but that's up to you).

I'll use AES-CBC with a keylength of 256 bits. Refer to 
[cgd(4)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?cgd+4+NetBSD-5.0.1+i386) and 
[cgdconfig(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?cgdconfig+8+NetBSD-5.0.1+i386) 
for details and alternatives.

The following command will create the parameter file as `/etc/cgd/image`. *YOU 
DO NOT WANT TO INVOKE THE FOLLOWING COMMAND AGAIN* after you burnt any CD, since 
a recreated parameter file is a lost parameter file and you'll never access your 
encrypted CD again (the "salt" this file contains will differ among each call). 
Consider this file being *HOLY, BACKUP IT* and *BACKUP IT AGAIN!* Use switch -V 
to specify verification method "disklabel" for the CD (cgd cannot detect whether 
you entered a valid password for the CD later when mounting it otherwise).

    # cgdconfig -g -V disklabel aes-cbc 256 > /etc/cgd/image

Now it's time to configure a cgd for our vnd drive. (Replace slice `d` with `c` 
for all platforms that use `c` as the whole disk (where
`sysctl kern.rawpartition` prints `2`, not `3`); if you're on i386 or amd64, `d` 
is OK for you):

    # cgdconfig -V re-enter cgd1 /dev/vnd0d /etc/cgd/image

The `-V re-enter` option is necessary as long as the cgd doesn't have a 
disklabel yet so we can access and configure it. This switch asks for a password 
twice and uses it for encryption.

Now it's time to create a disklabel inside the cgd. The defaults of the label 
are ok, so invoking disklabel with

    # disklabel -e -I cgd1

and leaving vi with `:wq` immediately will do.

Let's create a filesystem on the cgd, and finally mount it somewhere:

    # newfs /dev/rcgd1a
    # mount /dev/cgd1a /mnt

The cgd is alive! Now fill `/mnt` with content. When finished, reverse the 
configuration process. The steps are:

1.  Unmounting the cgd1a:

        # umount /mnt

2.  Unconfiguring the cgd:

        # cgdconfig -u cgd1

3.  Unconfiguring the vnd:

        # vnconfig -u vnd0


The following commands are examples to burn the images on CD or DVD. Please 
adjust the `dev=` for cdrecord or the `/dev/rcd0d` for growisofs. Note the 
`r` on the `rcd0d` *is* necessary with NetBSD. Growisofs is available in the 
[`sysutils/dvd+rw-tools`](http://ftp.NetBSD.org/pub/pkgsrc/current/pkgsrc/sysutils/dvd+rw-tools/README.html) 
package. Again, use `c` instead of `d` if this is the raw partition on your 
platform.

Finally, write the image file to a CD:

    # cdrecord dev=/dev/rcd0d -v image.img

...or to a DVD:

    # growisofs -dvd-compat -Z /dev/rcd0d=image.img

Congratulations! You've just created a really secure CD!

### Using an encrypted CD/DVD

After creating an encrypted CD as described above, we're not done yet - what 
about mounting it again? One might guess, configuring the cgd on `/dev/cd0d` is 
enough - no, it is not.

NetBSD cannot access FFS file systems on media that is not 512 bytes/sector 
format. It doesn't matter that the cgd on the CD is, since the CD's disklabel 
the cgd resides in has 2048 bytes/sector.

But the CD driver cd(4) is smart enough to grant write access to the 
(emulated) disklabel on the CD. So before configuring the cgd, let's have a look 
at the disklabel and modify it a bit:

    # disklabel -e cd0
    # /dev/rcd0d:
    type: ATAPI
    disk: mydisc
    label: fictitious
    flags: removable
    bytes/sector: 2048    # -- Change to 512 (= orig / 4)
    sectors/track: 100    # -- Change to 400 (= orig * 4)
    tracks/cylinder: 1
    sectors/cylinder: 100 # -- Change to 400 (= orig * 4)
    cylinders: 164
    total sectors: 16386  # -- Change to value of slice "d" (=65544)
    rpm: 300
    interleave: 1
    trackskew: 0
    cylinderskew: 0
    headswitch: 0           # microseconds
    track-to-track seek: 0  # microseconds
    drivedata: 0
    
    4 partitions:
    #     size  offset  fstype [fsize bsize cpg/sgs]
     a:   65544   0     4.2BSD  0     0     0  # (Cyl. 0 - 655+)
     d:   65544   0     ISO9660 0     0        # (Cyl. 0 - 655+)

Now as the disklabel is in 512 b/s format, accessing the CD is as easy as:

    # cgdconfig cgd1 /dev/cd0d /etc/cgd/image
    # mount -o ro /dev/cgd1a /mnt

Note that the cgd *MUST* be mounted read-only or you'll get illegal command 
errors from the cd(4) driver which can in some cases make even mounting a 
CD-based cgd impossible!

Now we're done! Enjoy your secure CD!

    # ls /mnt

Remember you have to reverse all steps to remove the CD:

    # umount /mnt
    # cgdconfig -u cgd1
    # eject cd0

## Suggestions and Warnings

You now have your filesystems encrypted within a `cgd`. When your machine is 
shut down, the data is protected, and can't be decrypted without the passphrase. 
However, there are still some dangers you should be aware of, and more you can 
do with `cgd`. This section documents several further suggestions and warnings 
	that will help you use `cgd` effectively.

 * Use multiple `cgd`'s for different kinds of data, one mounted all the time 
   and others mounted only when needed.

 * Use a `cgd` configured on top of a `vnd` made from a file on a remote network 
   fileserver (NFS, SMBFS, CODA, etc) to safely store private data on a shared 
   system. This is similar to the procedure for using encrypted CDs and DVDs 
   described in [[Example: encrypted CDs/DVDs|guide/cgd#cryptocds]].

### Using a random-key cgd for swap

You may want to use a dedicated random-key `cgd` for swap space, regenerating 
the key each reboot. The advantage of this is that once your machine is 
rebooted, any sensitive program memory contents that may have been paged out are 
permanently unrecoverable, because the decryption key is never known to you.

We created a temporary `cgd` with a random key when scrubbing the disk in the 
example above, using a shorthand `cgdconfig -s` invocation to avoid creating a 
parameters file.

The `cgdconfig` params file includes a *randomkey* keygen method. This is more 
appropriate for *permanent* random-key configurations, and facilitates the easy 
automatic configuration of these volumes at boot time.

For example, if you wanted to convert your existing `/dev/wd0b` partition to a 
dedicated random-key cgd1, use the following command to generate 
`/etc/cgd/wd0b`:

    # cgdconfig -g -o /etc/cgd/wd0b -V none -k randomkey blowfish-cbc

When using the randomkey keygen method, only verification method `none` can be 
used, because the contents of the new `cgd` are effectively random each time 
(the previous data decrypted with a random key). Likewise, the new disk will not 
have a valid label or partitions, and `swapctl` will complain about 
configuring swap devices not marked as such in a disklabel.

In order to automate the process of labeling the disk, prepare an appropriate 
disklabel and save it to a file, for example `/etc/cgd/wd0b.disklabel`. Please 
refer to 
[disklabel(8)](http://netbsd.gw.com/cgi-bin/man-cgi?disklabel+8+NetBSD-5.0.1+i386) 
for information about how to use `disklabel` to set up a swap partition.

On each reboot, to restore this saved label to the new `cgd`, create the 
`/etc/rc.conf.d/cgd` file as below:

    swap_device="cgd1"
    swap_disklabel="/etc/cgd/wd0b.disklabel"
    start_postcmd="cgd_swap"
    
    cgd_swap()
    {
        if [ -f $swap_disklabel ]; then
            disklabel -R -r $swap_device $swap_disklabel
        fi
    }

The same technique could be extended to encompass using `newfs` to re-create 
an `ffs` filesystem for `/tmp` if you didn't want to use `mfs`.

### Warnings

Prevent cryptographic disasters by making sure you can always recover your 
passphrase and parameters file. Protect the parameters file from disclosure, 
perhaps by storing it on removable media as above, because the salt it contains 
helps protect against dictionary attacks on the passphrase.

Keeping the data encrypted on your disk is all very well, but what about other 
copies? You already have at least one other such copy (the backup we used during 
this setup), and it's not encrypted. Piping `dump` through file-based 
encryption tools like **gpg** can be one way of addressing this issue, but make 
sure you have all the keys and tools you need to decrypt it to `restore` after 
a disaster.

Like any form of software encryption, the `cgd` key stays in kernel memory while 
the device is configured, and may be accessible to privileged programs and 
users, such as `/dev/kmem` grovellers. Taking other system security steps, such 
as running with elevated securelevel, is highly recommended.

Once the `cgd` volumes are mounted as normal filesystems, their contents are 
accessible like any other file. Take care of file permissions and ensure your 
running system is protected against application and network security attack.

Avoid using suspend/resume, especially for laptops with a BIOS suspend-to-disk 
function. If an attacker can resume your laptop with the key still in memory, or 
read it from the suspend-to-disk memory image on the hard disk later, the whole 
point of using `cgd` is lost.

## Further Reading

The following resources contain more information on CGD:

### Bibliography

 * [smackie-cgd]: [NetBSD CGD Setup](http://www.bsdguides.org/guides/netbsd/misc/cgd_setup.php)*. Stuart Mackie.
 * [nycbug-cgd]: [I want my cgd](http://genoverly.com/articles/view/5/) aka: I want an encrypted pseudo-device on my laptop*.
 * [elric-cgd]: The original paper on [The CryptoGraphic Disk Driver](http://www.imrryr.org/~elric/cgd/cgd.pdf)*. Roland Dowdeswell and John Ioannidis.
 * [biancuzzi-cgd]: [Inside NetBSD's CGD](http://onlamp.com/pub/a/bsd/2005/12/21/netbsd_cgd.html) - an interview with CGD creator Roland Dowdeswell*. Biancuzzi Federico.
 * [hubertf-cgd]: [CryptoGraphicFile (CGF)](http://www.feyrer.de/NetBSD/blog.html/nb_20060823_2311.html), or how to keep sensitive data on your laptop*. Feyrer Hubert.


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